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Abstract: It has been argued that elections should affect inflation, but evidence thus far has not 
incontrovertibly shown such an effect. We argue that monetary institutions offset inflationary 
pressures originated by the electoral cycle. Delegation of monetary policy to independent central 
banks curbs politically induced inflationary pressures. The anti-inflationary effects of central bank 
independence depend on the governments’ incentives to boost the economy, a root of 
inflationary pressures. Those incentives are stronger in election years, especially when there is 
uncertainty about the electoral results. Independent central banks are better suited to counter 
inflation under those circumstances. Statistical analyses on a sample of 143 developing countries 
between 1980 and 2012 show that the anti-inflationary effects of central bank independence are 
larger during election years, and when elections are more contested. These results are robust to 
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In developing countries, governments are often reproached for their pre-electoral behavior that 
results in higher inflation. Electorally motivated fiscal spending, vote buying, or simply money 
printing (Pourcelot 2015) originate inflationary pressures on central banks pursuing monetary 
stability. For example, Myanmar’s rising deficit and inflation were directly blamed on the 2015 
election needs of the incumbent. This worried IMF economists regarding the central bank’s 
ability to moderate the inflationary splurge (Kyaw 2015). The Financial Times reported that 2011 
elections in Thailand increased inflation, forcing the central bank to move “aggressively to keep it 
under control” (Johnston 2011). Similarly, the Central Bank of Kenya had to “mop excess cash in 
the economy” because of formal and informal spending – voter bribing – related to the elections 
(Ramogi 2017). Beyond anecdotes, it is assumed that incumbents will use all the tools at their 
disposal to win elections, and those tools are likely to generate inflation. However, there is little 
evidence regarding any effect of opportunistic electoral behavior on inflation. In this paper, we 
analyze to what extent independent central banks are successful in countering inflationary 
pressures originated in election years. 
Does central bank independence offset inflationary pressures originated by the electoral 
cycle? The ability of the central bank to design and implement monetary policy free from political 
influences – central bank independence – is a key instrument devised to control inflation 
(Goodfriend 2007). Shielded from political pressures, central bankers can pursue more 
conservative policies. Thus, independent central banks should be better equipped to smooth 
politically-induced inflationary cycles. In this paper we show this effect: during election times, 
when incumbents have increased incentives to enact polices with inflationary effects, central 
bank independence has stronger anti-inflationary effects. 
Our paper addresses two important discussions in the literature: the effects of central 
bank independence, and the existence and extent of opportunistic political cycles. On the one 
hand, the literature suggests that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank 
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should solve the time-inconsistency problem, and curb politically induced inflationary pressures 
(Barro 1986, Barro and Gordon 1983a, b, Kydland and Prescott 1977, Rogoff 1985). However, 
there is mixed evidence regarding the existence and magnitude of such effects, especially in 
developing countries. On the other hand, the literature on the political business cycle expects 
electorally-induced inflation cycles (Nordhaus 1975). However, there is weak evidence regarding 
inflationary cycles associated with elections (Abrams and Iossifov 2006, Funashima 2016, Lewis-
Beck 1988).1 
We argue that these inconsistencies between theoretical expectations and evidence may 
result both from an incomplete consideration of the governments’ incentives and ability to use 
monetary policy, and from a selection bias associated with the sample size. This article deals with 
both issues. First, on the theory side, we analyze the effect of elections on inflation within the 
framework of domestic and international constraints to the government’s ability to affect 
monetary outcomes. We argue that independent central banks curb directly and indirectly the 
inflationary effects of political decisions. Independent central banks directly limit the 
government’s ability to use monetary policy – and thus, inflation – and, indirectly, they can 
counter fiscal policy’s inflationary effects. Independent central banks’ anti-inflationary effects 
should especially make a difference when governments have more incentives to enact monetary or 
fiscal policies that generate inflation. In election years, and particularly, when there is more 
uncertainty about the election’s results, incumbents are more inclined to boost the economy, 
even if that generates inflation. In those circumstances central bank independence should matter 
more, smoothing electorally-induced inflation cycles. This would explain why analyses that do 
consider central bank independence fail to find opportunistic inflationary cycles, and why studies 
                                                 
1 As discussed below, there is evidence of an opportunistic cycle in the use of monetary and fiscal 
instruments, not in inflation as an outcome. 
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that do not accounting for electoral incentives find weak effects of central bank independence on 
inflation. 
Second, on the empirical side, we test our argument on a sample of 143 developing 
countries between 1980 and 2012. This is the largest sample used in studies of the anti-
inflationary effects of central bank independence thanks to new data on central bank 
independence (Garriga 2016), on a country-year basis.2 This sample allows us to test the general 
relationship between central bank independence and inflation with reduced concerns regarding 
selection bias, and permits analyzing this relationship during election and non-election years. 
Our findings contribute to three literatures. First, they extend the literature on political 
business cycles, suggesting the need to account for monetary constraints to the incumbents’ 
ability to manipulate the economy to identify inflationary cycles. Second, they contribute to the 
literature on the effects of central bank independence. We show that delegation to central banks 
has different effects depending on governments’ incentives to use monetary policy for electoral 
purposes. Furthermore, our findings broaden the scope of application of the literature on central 
bank independence. We find that, although institutional constraints affect the anti-inflationary 
effects of central bank independence, these effects exceed a small group of democracies. 
Monetary commitments seem to tame inflationary incentives in an important group of non-
democratic regimes. Third, our research speaks not only to the literature on delegation and 
central bank independence, but also to the literature on the effects of institutions in authoritarian 
regimes.  
                                                 
2 The largest study published on this matter covered 72 countries, between 1972 and 2008 (Bodea 
and Hicks 2015b). 
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Central bank independence and inflation 
There is a prevalent policy consensus around the convenience of granting independence to 
central banks to control inflation. The theoretical framework for this policy advise comes mainly 
from the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977), who propose delegation of monetary decisions to 
central banks as a solution to the time consistency problem. Price stability commitments are 
time-inconsistent because once nominal wages are set, governments may benefit from using 
monetary policy to produce short-term increases in employment and output, generating 
inflationary pressures. These attempts raise inflation but are ineffective in terms of employment 
(Rogoff 1985). The “rules versus discretion” literature (Barro 1986, Barro and Gordon 1983a, b, 
Rogoff 1985) suggests that politicians delegate the decision-making power on monetary issues to 
independent agents – that is, central bankers. The agents’ independence is guaranteed by 
shielding their survival and decisions from political pressures. In this way, distributional or 
electoral considerations should not drive monetary policy decisions.  
The evidence supporting this widespread policy advice, however, is not robust. Although 
several studies find a negative relationship between central bank independence and inflation 
(Bodea and Hicks 2015b, Cukierman, et al. 2002, Persson and Tabellini 1990, Rogoff 1985), 
others question actual impact of central bank independence on inflation (Campillo and Miron 
1997, Forder 1998, Mas 1995, Oatley 1999, Posen 1993), especially for developing countries 
(Crowe and Meade 2007, Cukierman 1992, Cukierman, et al. 1992, Klomp and De Haan 2010).3 
Furthermore, the results seem to be very sensitive to the sample used for the empirical test 
(Garriga 2016, Klomp and De Haan 2010). 
Franzese (1999) makes a general case for how the broader political-economic 
environment should affect the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence. Several 
                                                 
3 For a review of this literature, see de Haan and Eijffinger (1996), and Alesina and Stella (2010). 
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studies follow the suggestion of more complex – interactive – models to assess the effects of this 
independence. For example, some show that the effect of central bank independence on inflation 
depends on the government’s partisanship (Clark and Arel-Bundock 2013, Franzese 1999), on 
labor-market regimes (Acocella, et al. 2008, Franzese 2001, Hall and Franzese 1998), or on 
international exposure (Franzese 1999). In spite of the advancement of the theory, these studies 
tend to focus on developed democracies, whose institutional commitments are generally stable 
and credible. 
More recent studies stress that the effect of delegation to central banks on economic 
outcomes depends, precisely, on the credibility of the government’s commitment to respect 
independence. The literature suggests that the strength of political institutions affects the 
credibility of central bank independence and its inflationary-curbing effects. Empirical evidence 
suggests that those effects only occur in democracies (Bodea and Hicks 2015b, Bodea and 
Higashijima 2015). However, to our knowledge, there is no research on whether the anti-
inflationary effects of central bank independence also vary through time. 
 
Opportunistic cycles and inflation 
The literature on political business cycles stresses the varying incentives politicians face 
throughout their tenure, starting from two assumptions: the short-term tradeoff between 
inflation and unemployment, and voters’ ignorance of the structure of the economy (Nordhaus 
1975:172).4 Voters prefer both low inflation and low unemployment, but the effects of higher 
unemployment on the voter’s income are more apparent than the effects of more inflation. “In 
the absence of convincing explanations, a deterioration in the level (or growth) of real income 
will be blamed on the party in power,” and voters will punish the incumbent (Nordhaus 
                                                 
4 The latter assumption is contested in the literature (Nordhaus 1989, Rogoff and Sibert 1988). 
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1975:173). Additionally, individuals vote assessing their immediate economic experience – they 
heavily discount the past. Voters’ wellbeing improvement or deterioration should affect 
politicians’ survival more when it happens closer to elections (Kiewiet 1983, Lewis-Beck 1988). 
Because incumbents want to retain power, they will try to manipulate the economy to generate 
short-term welfare improvements especially before elections.5 
Although there is no doubt that elections are crucial times for politicians’ survival, the 
existence and effects of opportunistic political business cycles is still a matter of debate.6 
Although the evidence linking elections and policy instruments is extensive,7 that is not the case 
for macroeconomic outcomes. In particular, empirical evidence of opportunistic cycles on 
inflation is weak (Lewis-Beck 1988) or mixed (Abrams and Iossifov 2006, Funashima 2016). 
Furthermore, in most OECD countries the evidence points in the opposite direction: there are 
monetary expansions before elections, and inflation escalations after elections (Alesina, et al. 
1992), but this effect has not been observed in the U.S. since 1979 (Drazen 2001:85). 
The scarce evidence showing opportunistic cycles affecting inflation may result from 
insufficient attention to the context in which politicians operate, particularly, the monetary 
                                                 
5 Nordhaus (1989) summarizes other approaches to the study of political cycles. 
6 We understand survival broadly, including both power retention by the ruler, personally – 
reelection – or by the ruler’s party. 
7 For example, in developed countries, there is evidence of an opportunistic cycle in fiscal policy 
(Alt and Lassen 2006, Klomp and De Haan 2013), public employment (Aaskoven 2016), and 
other policies (Alesina, et al. 1997). In developing countries, there is evidence of electoral cycles 
in fiscal policy (Gonzalez 2002), privatizations (Lami, et al. 2016), debt interest payments (Sáez 
2016), and exchange rate regimes (Schuknecht 1999), among other policies (Ames 1987, Remmer 
1993). Dubois (2016) cites more examples. 
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institutional framework. Models studying opportunistic cycles rarely account for the 
government’s ability to affect monetary policy, that is, whether the central bank is independent, 
and to what extent said independence is credible. For example, the literature on context-
dependent opportunistic cycles (Clark 2003, Clark and Reichert 1998, Franzese 2002) focuses on 
prior institutional choices – namely, exchange rate regime and central bank independence – that 
limit the control elected officials can have on the inflation rate. According to this literature, in the 
presence of international capital mobility, we should observe two kinds of opportunistic cycles: 
monetary cycles should happen only in countries with floating exchange rates and dependent 
central banks, and fiscal cycles in countries with fixed exchange rates, regardless of the central 
bank’s powers (Clark 2003:89, Clark and Hallerberg 2000).8 Empirical tests on monetary and 
fiscal instruments – money supply and gross debt – and on some outcomes – growth and 
unemployment – provide support for this argument (Clark 2003:90, Clark and Hallerberg 2000). 
Yet, the effect of elections on inflation is not tested.   
To study inflation, we build on the literature on context-dependent opportunistic cycles. 
However, we focus on the role of central banks and depart from this literature in two important 
ways.  First, this literature predicts inflationary pressures coming from monetary policy during 
elections under three conditions – capital mobility, dependent central banks, and floating 
exchange rates. However, fiscal cycles can plausible generate inflation during election years. 
Consequently, central bank independence should still matter to explain inflationary outcomes.  
Second, the effects of central bank independence are a function of this institutional 
commitment’s credibility. Although said credibility can be assumed for advanced democracies, to 
build a general explanation we factor in that the commitment to central bank independence can 
be more or less credible. 
                                                 
8 Countries with floating exchange rates and central bank independence should not exhibit fiscal 
or monetary cycles. 
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Central bank independence and inflationary opportunistic cycles 
The idea that independent central banks are anti-inflationary institutions relies on the assumption 
that central bankers and incumbents have contrasting preferences. Central bankers prefer price 
stability to other goals towards which monetary policy could be used – they are more 
conservative than incumbents. Politicians may desire price stability, but their most important 
motivation is to retain power – their political survival (Ames 1987, Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 
2003). All other policy goals – including price stability – depend on politicians having the power 
to rule and enact policies. Because politicians are always tempted to use all instruments to secure 
their survival, protections on central bankers’ decisions should reduce inflationary pressures on 
monetary policy, increasing price stability. 
We argue that inflationary pressures on monetary policy are not constant through time. 
In particular, there are stronger incentives to enact inflationary policies in election years. Facing 
election, incumbents may generate inflationary pressures through demands for the central bank 
to loosen the monetary policy, or through an expansionary fiscal policy (Bodea and Higashijima 
2015, Brender and Drazen 2005, Clark and Hallerberg 2000, Treisman and Gimpelson 2001). 
However, the effect of political pressures on inflation should be a function of the central bank’s 
ability to resist or counter these pressures. Protections to central banks’ decision-making should 
matter more during election years because in those years central banks need to weather stronger 
attempts to affect monetary outcomes. In fact, elections may test the extent of independence that 
central banks enjoy. We argue that previous studies do not generally find inflationary 
opportunistic cycles precisely because they do not account for central bank independence having 
stronger inflation-curbing effects during elections. 
The distinctive role of central banks during election and non-election years may seem 
uncontroversial. In fact, economists state that “the most obvious advantage a fully independent 
central bank has is that of not being influenced by electoral deadlines” (Muscatelli 1998:503). 
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However, the effect of elections on the behavior of central banks is still not clear. Some research 
finds that central banks do not alter their policy during elections (Alesina and Stella 2010, Allen 
and McCrickard 1991, Beck 1987, Leertouwer and Maier 2002).  Others show that central banks 
accommodate to pressures from the executive during elections, suggesting that central bank 
independence matters less in those times (Abrams and Iossifov 2006, Clark and Arel-Bundock 
2013, Funashima 2013, Woolley 1984). Finally, the few studies suggesting that central bank 
independence should matter more during election years either restrict this effect to democracies 
(Franzese 1999:681), or do not analyze developing countries (Clark 2003). These qualifications 
are important for our argument for two reasons. 
First, elections are crucial times not only in democracies. Many authoritarian regimes 
organize more or less transparent elections, and these elections open the possibility of political 
realignments and, sometimes, of government turnover. In election times, economic performance 
may affect the incumbents’ likelihood of retaining power (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 1997, 
Soh 1988:272), or alter the incumbents’ bargaining power inside the ruling coalition or with other 
groups (Greene 2010, Magaloni 1999, 2006). Thus, less democratic incumbents should also have 
incentives to manipulate the economy to win elections (Levitsky and Way 2002, Schedler 2006, 
2009).9  
We expect increased inflationary pressures when autocrats face elections with some 
probability of adverse electoral results, and we posit that independent central banks can curb 
those inflationary pressures too. Although the role of monetary commitments in less democratic 
countries is not widely studied, recent research shows that institutions also matter in authoritarian 
regimes (Boix and Svolik 2013, Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Furthermore, an 
                                                 
9 In fact, there is some evidence of fiscal business cycles in authoritarian regimes (Blaydes 2011, 
Guo 2009, Pepinsky 2007). 
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incipient research suggests that central bank independence may be credible in autocracies under 
certain circumstances (Bodea, et al. 2016, Garriga and Meseguer 2017, Johnson 2016). 
Second, developing countries are of especial interest for our theory.  In developing 
countries, weaker institutional controls should make it easier for politicians to manipulate 
monetary and fiscal policy (Schuknecht 1996, Shi and Svensson 2006). Relatively weak 
institutions also result in “vastly greater levels of uncertainty” for developing democracies, 
increasing incentives to influence electoral results (Lupu and Riedl 2013:1344, 1348). Remarkably, 
the same reasons that make opportunistic cycles more likely in developing countries should also 
make institutional constraints – and thus, central bank independence – less effective, and this 
should be particularly important in the case of election years. (This would make developing 
countries a “hard case” to test our theory, because central banks’ protections should be less 
effective in less democratic contexts.) 
Second, developing countries are of especial interest for our theory.  Political parties have 
“vastly greater levels of uncertainty in developing democracies” (Lupu and Riedl 2013:1344, 1348).  
This uncertainty should increase the incumbent’s incentives to influence electoral results. 
Additionally, in these countries, relatively weaker institutional controls make it easier for 
politicians to manipulate monetary and fiscal policy (Schuknecht 1996, Shi and Svensson 2006). 
Remarkably, the same reasons that make opportunistic cycles more likely in developing countries 
should also make institutional constraints – and thus, central bank independence – less effective, 
and this should be particularly important in the case of election years. (This would make 
developing countries a “hard case” to test our theory, because central banks’ protections should 
be less effective in less democratic contexts.) 
Although it seems counterintuitive, developing countries have reasons to respect central 
bank independence especially when it is very costly – that is, during elections. In these countries, 
compromising central bank independence entails important reputational and signaling 
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considerations. First, violating institutional commitments can generate audience costs – and not 
only in democracies (Weeks 2008).10 Second, and more importantly, central bank independence is 
a “good signal” to international markets, and it is associated with more investment and better 
credit conditions (Bodea and Hicks 2015a, Maxfield 1997, Polillo and Guillén 2005). Because 
developing countries are more vulnerable to international markets distrust, governments have 
additional incentives to respect central bank independence, even when the electoral cycle may 
pose incentives in the opposite direction. Based on these considerations, we expect a stronger 
anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence in election years in developing countries.11  
Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence is stronger in election years, contingent on 
democracy. 
 
For reasons mentioned above, we follow the literature and condition the magnitude of 
the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence on democracy, as a proxy for both the 
credibility of institutional constraints, and of the probability of losing elections.12 
                                                 
10 Consider, for example, domestic and international reactions to attempts to restrict CBI in 
Venezuela or Poland ("Foreign Economists Concerned over Attacks on Central Bank 
Independence"  2006, Rozlal 2009). 
11  Alpanda and Honig (2010) use the behavior of central banks during election years as an 
indicator of de facto central bank independence. 
12 Even if there are nominal elections in fully authoritarian regimes, we expect to observe an 
opportunistic cycle – and thus, a larger effect of central bank independence – on inflation, when 
there is some probability that the incumbents lose elections. 
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Not all incumbents have the same incentives to manipulate the economy for electoral 
purposes (Schultz 1995). The incentives to use monetary policy to generate opportunistic cycles 
should be stronger when there is more incertitude about the electoral result. There is evidence 
that the electoral margin of victory affects the opportunistic behavior of incumbents (Aidt, et al. 
2011), the economy in general (Fowler 2006), and exchange rate depreciations (Stein, et al. 2005). 
Furthermore, anecdotic evidence suggests that tight elections affect central banks decisions 
(Erlam 2017, Koranyi and Canepa 2017), suggesting that close elections are a serious threat to 
central bank independence (Daily Nation 216, Ren 2014).  Our theory suggests that if central 
bank independence is an effective tool to counter political pressures, its effects should be more 
pronounced when these pressures are more intense. Therefore, we expect the inflation-curbing 
effects of central bank independence to be a stronger in more contested elections. This 
expectation is consistent with the idea that independence should have “little further anti-
inflationary impact” where the political and economic structure would lead governments to 
produce low inflation anyway (Franzese 1999:625). Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence is stronger in contested elections. 
 
Empirical analysis  
Data description 
Our dataset covers 143 developing (non-OECD) countries between 1980 and 2012. Appendix A 
lists the countries included. The main dependent variable is Inflation, measured as the logarithm 
of the average twelve-month growth rate of the consumer price index, and taken from the 
International Financial Statistics from the IMF.  
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To measure central bank independence (CBI), we use the most comprehensive dataset on 
de jure central bank independence available to the date (Garriga 2016).13 This dataset follows 
Cukierman, et al.’s (1992) criteria, and codes 16 written legal variables related to the chief 
executive officer of the bank (appointment, dismissal, and term of office), policy formulation 
attributions (who formulates and has the final decision in monetary policy, and the role of the 
central bank in the budget process), central bank’s objectives, and central bank’s limitations on 
lending to the public sector. The scores are combined in a single index that ranges from 0 
(lowest) to 1 (highest independence). We prefer this widely used indicator of statutory 
independence over other de facto measures for several reasons (Garriga 2016). First, compared 
with de facto measures based on questionnaires (e.g., Blinder 2000, Cukierman, et al. 1992, Fry, et 
al. 1996), de jure measures have better coverage and cross-country comparability than that of de 
facto indicators. Furthermore, de jure indicators exhibit more within-country variation. Finally, the 
alternative form of measuring de facto independence – the turnover rate of central bankers 
(Cukierman and Webb 1995, Cukierman, et al. 1992, de Haan and Siermann 1996) has been 
shown to be endogenous to inflation (Dreher, et al. 2008). 
We proxy Democracy using Polity2, that ranges from -10 to 10 (Marshall and Jaggers 2012). 
Alternatively, we use the average of a country’s political rights and civil liberties score from 
Freedom House (2012). We identify election years following the Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI) (Cruz, et al. 2016). We code two sets of dichotomous variables: Executive 
election and Legislative election equal 1 to indicate the occurrence of an election for the executive or 
legislative branches, respectively, in a given year. Both elections indicate the concurrence of 
elections for both branches in the same year. Alternatively, Any election is coded 1 in years in 
which an election for executive, legislative or both branches, and zero otherwise. To test 
                                                 
13 The complete dataset includes 182 countries, from 1970 to 2012, on a country-year basis. 
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hypothesis 2, we include Margin of majority, the fraction of seats held by the government as the 
result of the election, also from the DPI. 
Our baseline model includes controls for other factors known to affect inflation such as 
real GDP per capita, Trade openness, the sum of exports plus imports as a share of GDP, and World 
Inflation, measured as the annual change of the average consumer price index in the rest of the 
world. These variables come from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2015). Fiscal 
balance is the difference between revenues and expenditures as a share of the GDP, and comes 
from the World Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund 2015). Peg captures the 
existence of a fixed exchange rate regime based on the de facto exchange rate regime classification 
by Reinhart & Rogoff (2004, 2009). This dichotomous variable equals 1 when there is no 
separate legal tender, when there is a pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement, when 
there is a pre-announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, or when there 
is a de facto peg, and zero otherwise. Finally, we also include time and country dummies. 
As part of the robustness checks, we also control for political instability – Banks and 
Wilson’s (2016) weighted measure of the number of assassinations, strikes, guerrilla warfare, 
major crises, purges, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations in a particular 
country and year – and for Capital Openness, Chinn and Ito’s (2008) index of the extensity of 
capital account controls, based on the information from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.14  Finally, we control for the executive’s partisanship 
                                                 
14 Following Clark and Hallerberg (2000), our main models assume capital mobility after the end 
of the Bretton Woods system. However, we test whether our results are robust to variance in 
capital controls. 
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using the DPI’s variable EXECLCR. Left is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for left-leaning 
executives (EXECLCR=3), and zero otherwise. Appendix B presents descriptive statistics. 15 
Estimation Strategy 
Based on the panel structure of the data, where subscripts i and t represent country and time 
period respectively, our benchmark specification can be represented by 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡+𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡+𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡   (1) 
where yit and yit-1 are the logarithm of the inflation rate for country i at time t and time t-1, 
respectively; CBIit is our measure of central bank independence; Demit  is a proxy for democracy; 
Xit-1 represents a vector of lagged time-varying control variables; 𝜉t is a period-specific constant to 
account for common shocks; 𝜂i is an unobserved county-specific effect that captures all time-
invariant factors that affect the outcome; and it is the error term. The inclusion of the interaction 
term enables the analysis of both the direct and indirect effects of CBI and democracy on 
inflation. 
To estimate our benchmark specification we use a dynamic panel model with fixed 
effects. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in this type of setup could introduce a bias 
(Nickell 1981). In particular, when the number of time-series observations (T) is small this 
problem is nontrivial since shocks to fixed effects do not diminish over time (Wooldridge 2002). 
However, Beck and Katz (2011) and Beck et al. (2014) argue that when T is 30 or 40 – in our 
case is 32 – the bias is significantly reduced.16 Interestingly enough, Beck and Katz (2011) 
                                                 
15  Several studies of opportunistic political business use country-quarter as unit of analysis. 
Arguably, that unit of analysis is appropriate to observe finer changes in inflation levels as the 
election-day approaches. However, that unit of analysis is not appropriate for our analysis 
because all other control variables are registered yearly. 
16 In Beck et al. (2014) for T=40 and N=200 the bias in their point estimate is only -0.01. 
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conclude that regardless of the number of cross-sectional units (N) – in our case is between 119 
and 143 – with a reasonable T, the Nickel bias is trivially small. 
Results  
Hypothesis 1 states that the negative relationship between CBI and inflation should be stronger 
during election years, when incumbents have more incentives to manipulate the economy. 
Descriptive data suggest the plausibility of this hypothesis. Excluding outliers, the sample mean 
for Inflation is 17.2%.17  However, the mean inflation rate is higher in subsamples of election than 
in non-election years (18.8% and 16.7%, respectively). Figure 1 shows a clearer image of the 
relationship between election years and inflation. It plots the mean inflation rate in election years 
(year=0) and the years before and after elections in all developing countries in our sample (left-
side panel). On average, in developing countries the inflation rate is higher in election years. The 
center and right-side panels show the same data in subsamples of countries with low and high 
central bank independence (we use CBI=.5 as cut-point), and highlight two interesting points. 
First, higher CBI is associated with lower inflation. After removing outliers, the mean inflation 
rate is 25% for countries with low CBI, and 11% for countries with high CBI. Second, the 
pattern along the electoral cycle is sharper for countries with low CBI than in the whole sample, 
but the “cycle” disappears for countries with high CBI. Appendix C shows the mean inflation in 




                                                 
17 We exclude observations with annual inflation larger than 1,000%. 
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Figure 1. Inflation mean and election years. Developing countries, 1980-2012 
 
 
Although suggestive, these data do not control for confounding factors. As preliminary 
analyses, we run naïve tests of the effect of elections on inflation, just controlling for the 
occurrence of elections in a given year. In these models, neither Any election, nor the set of 
variables indicating different kinds of elections (Executive, Legislative, and Both elections) is 
statistically significant – consistent with other studies (Bodea and Hicks 2015b). See Tables D1 
(Polity2) and D2 (Freedom House) in appendix D.18  In all these models, CBI is negatively 
associated with inflation (both when interacted with the Democracy variables and in models 
without interactions). The coefficients associated with Peg and Fiscal balance are negative and 
statistically significant. The lagged dependent variable and GDP per capita are positive and 
statistically significant. Overall, the effects of the control variables are consistent across models.  
These preliminary tests seem to indicate the absence of election-induced inflationary 
cycles. We argue, however, that these models do not provide an appropriate test for our 
                                                 
18 Tables D1 and D2 show models without CBI, with CBI, and interacting CBI with Democracy. 
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hypotheses. Our theory states that central bank independence matters differently in election and 
non-election years. Thus, the inclusion of controls for election years should not capture the 
effect of independent central banks facing stronger inflationary pressures. We therefore divide 
the sample in election and non-election years, depending on the occurrence of national executive 
or legislative elections in a given year. Splitting the sample avoids triple interactions, and allows 
for the possibility that the determinants of inflation have differential effects during election and 
non-election years. We include models on the full sample as a baseline for comparison. Table 1 
shows the results for hypothesis 1. Models 1 to 3 (4 to 6) are run on the full sample, and on sub-
samples of non-election and election years, respectively. Models 1 to 3 proxy Democracy with 
Polity2, and Models 4 to 6 with Freedom House.  
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Table 1: Effect of CBI on inflation conditioned by democracy, 1980-2012.  
 Polity2 Freedom House 
 Full sample Non- election 
years 
Election years Full sample Non-  
election years 
Election years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CBI  -0.571** -0.435 -0.954** -0.986 -0.831 -1.461* 
 (0.279) (0.332) (0.409) (0.656) (0.724) (0.810) 
Democracy 0.021 0.019 0.020 -0.065 -0.038 -0.133 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.082) (0.092) (0.107) 
CBI*Democracy -0.031 -0.034 -0.026 0.067 0.043 0.148 
 (0.033) (0.042) (0.043) (0.150) (0.179) (0.172) 
Inflationt-1  0.334*** 0.340*** 0.392*** 0.306*** 0.300*** 0.397*** 
 (0.051) (0.049) (0.105) (0.048) (0.045) (0.101) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.332*** 0.287** 0.633* 0.373*** 0.353** 0.605* 
 (0.125) (0.141) (0.328) (0.127) (0.138) (0.307) 
Trade opennesst-1 0.000 0.002* -0.003 0.001 0.002* -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Peg -0.278*** -0.161* -0.613*** -0.313*** -0.217*** -0.605*** 
 (0.073) (0.083) (0.128) (0.073) (0.082) (0.129) 
World Inflationt-1 -0.007 -0.016 -0.015 -0.004 -0.012 -0.008 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.033) (0.015) (0.020) (0.032) 
Fiscal Balancet-1 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.012** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.012** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) 
Total Effect of CBI -0.601** -0.468 -0.981**  -0.919*  -0.788 -1.314** 
(β1 + β3) (0.277) (0.323) (0.404) (0.526) (0.571) (0.662) 
R2 0.220 0.211 0.339 0.178 0.158 0.338 
N. observations 1833 1326 507 2109 1570 539 
N. of countries 126 125 119 143 142 128 
Note: Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects (not 
reported). * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Given the inclusion of interactive terms, the coefficients are not informative of the effect 
of CBI at different levels of Democracy. Figure 2 shows the joint effect of these variables, and 
allows a proper interpretation of the results (Brambor, et al. 2006). In the full sample, CBI is 
significantly negatively associated with inflation (at .05 level) when Polity2 is ≥1, that is, even for 
authoritarian regimes.19  Similarly, the negative association is significant when Freedom House is 
≤5.20  These findings contrast with prior studies showing that CBI has anti-inflationary effects 
only in democracies (Bodea and Hicks 2015b, Bodea and Higashijima 2015). The credibility of 
institutional constraints, however, seems to matter. The anti-inflationary effect of CBI is stronger 
in more democratic contexts. For the most autocratic countries in which this relationship is 
significant (Polity2=1), an increase in CBI from its minimum to its maximum is associated with a 
1.8–point drop in the inflation rate. For the most democratic countries (Polity2=10), this drop 
equals 2.4 points. Using Freedom House scores, the same increase in CBI is associated with 
decreases of 2.0 and 2.3 points in the inflation rate (Freedom House=4 and 2, respectively). This 
is consistent with the idea that domestic institutions’ strength matters. 
 
  
                                                 
19 We use a conservative approach for the substantive interpretation, discussing results that are 
significant at least at .05 level. CBI is significantly negatively associated with inflation (at .1 level) 
when Polity2 is ≥–1. 
20 The marginal effect is significant at the .05 level when Freedom House is between 2 and 4 (at 
the .1 level when Freedom House=1 and 5). 
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Figure 2:  Marginal effects of Central bank independence on Inflation, at different levels of Democracy 
 
Note: For comparison purposes, the x-axis is reversed in the Freedom House graphs 
 
However, the analyses on split samples show that the effect of central bank independence 
on inflation is significantly larger in election years than in non-election ones, both for 
democracies and electoral authoritarianisms. During election years, an increase in CBI from its 
minimum to its maximum in authoritarian countries (Polity2=-2) is associated with a 2.5–point 
drop in the inflation rate, and with a 3.6-point drop in the most democratic countries 
(Polity2=10). In non-election years, the magnitude of the inflationary-curbing effect is smaller, 
and only significant at the .1 level. We obtain similar results using Freedom House: holding 
everything else constant, the same change in CBI is associated with a 2.4 and 3.7 (Freedom 













































negative relationship between central bank independence and inflation rates is stronger during 
electoral years.  
 
Figure 3:  Marginal effects of Central bank independence on Inflation in election years, conditional on 
Margin of majority. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 expects the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence to be 
stronger in contested elections because the incentives to manipulate the economy should grow as 
the risk of losing power increases – therefore, central bank independence should matter more 
when the electoral result is less certain. Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of CBI on inflation, 
conditional on the margin of majority, during election years – using different measures of 
Democracy as controls.21 Using either measure of Democracy as control, central bank independence’s 
inflationary-curbing effect is the strongest when elections are decided by a minimum margin. 
                                                 
21 For the full models, see appendix E. 
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However, this effect becomes smaller and insignificant when elections are less competitive (when 
Margin of majority>50%). Substantively, an increase of CBI from its minimum to its maximum is 
associated with a 9.6-point drop in inflation in election years in which the election is decided by a 
5% margin. If the electoral margin is 20% – arguably, a less competitive election – the expected 
effect of the same increase in central bank independence is associated with 6.6-point drop in 
inflation. If the margin is 45%, the expected reduction in inflation is 3.6 percent points. 
Robustness Checks 
Our results are robust to changes in the model specification and the estimation methodology. 
First, we control for political instability and capital account openness (see appendix F). As 
expected, the coefficients associated with Instability and with Capital Openness are positive and 
negative, respectively, but only Capital Openness is statistically significant. In other words, more 
capital controls are associated with higher inflation. Our main results remain stable and 
significant, as shown in appendix F. 
Second, the literature on context-dependent political business cycles suggest in a context 
of capital mobility, the exchange rate regime should affect the ability of governments to influence 
monetary outcomes (Clark 2003, Clark and Hallerberg 2000, Clark and Reichert 1998). In 
particular, fixed exchange-rate regimes together with high levels of capital mobility “denies 
policymakers the degree of national monetary policy autonomy required to manipulate 
macroeconomic outcomes for electoral purposes” (Clark and Reichert 1998:88). In those cases, 
central bank independence should be irrelevant. In our main models, we control for the 
exchange rate regime (Peg). However, an interaction between CBI and Peg allows us to 
determine whether central bank independence has an anti-inflationary effect even in the presence 
of a fixed exchange rate. Appendix G shows that in non-election years, CBI does not have a 
significant effect on inflation when there is a fixed exchange rate. However, in election years, 
central bank independence has inflation-curbing effects even in the presence of a fixed exchange 
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rate. This suggests that independent central banks may be countering the inflationary effects of 
fiscal expansions (Clark and Hallerberg 2000). Finally, we control for partisanship. Left does not 
achieve statistical significance, and our results hold (see Appendix H). 
We also use alternative estimation methodologies. The inclusion of lagged independent 
variables may not eliminate potential endogeneity and reverse causation problems. If CBI is 
correlated with regressors from equation (1), the main result may not hold. More importantly, 
inflation rates may affect the level of independence granted to the central bank. To account for 
these potential effects we perform an instrumental variable (IV) approach where CBI is treated as 
an endogenous variable. Bodea and Hicks (2015a) show that central bank reform is mainly driven 
by diffusion. Thus, we instrument CBIi for country i with the regional average of CBI (excluding 
country i). Past levels of this instrument are relevant in predicting country i’s current CBI 
(correlation is 0.52) and it is unlikely to be determined country i’s inflation rate (Bodea and Hicks 
2015a).  
Given that CBI has direct and indirect effects on inflation rate, in the context of an IV 
approach we need a second instrument. We use the interaction between the regional average of 
CBI (excluding country i) and the level of democracy (as suggested by Wooldridge 2002).22  Table 
2 shows the main results. The IV approach produces results qualitatively similar to those found 
in the main models. In all cases, the joint F-statistics of the first stage of the IV regressions show 
that the instruments are relevant and greater that Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule of thumb of 10.23 
 
                                                 
22 The drawback of this approach is that the collinearity of both instruments can affect the 
standard errors and significance of the instruments considered. 
23 As expected, one of the instruments is strongly significant and captures most of the variation 
of the first stage. 
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Table 2: Effect of CBI on inflation conditioned by democracy, 1980-2012. Instrumental variables with robust standard errors 
 Polity2 Freedom House 
 Full sample Non-election years Election years Full sample Non-election years Election years 
CBI  -1.408** -0.883 -2.945** -2.178*** -1.696 -4.076*** 
 (0.696) (0.729) (1.334) (0.824) (1.035) (1.563) 
Democracy 0.041 0.045 0.048 -0.021 0.006 -0.190 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.051) (0.104) (0.116) (0.211) 
CBI*Democracy -0.070 -0.091 -0.055 -0.061 -0.082 0.196 
 (0.059) (0.064) (0.103) (0.219) (0.255) (0.395) 
Inflationt-1  0.318*** 0.327*** 0.361*** 0.284*** 0.283*** 0.356*** 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.093) (0.037) (0.039) (0.090) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.396*** 0.300 0.945*** 0.508*** 0.454*** 0.945*** 
 (0.137) (0.178) (0.347) (0.127) (0.156) (0.323) 
Trade opennesst-1 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.003** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Peg -0.303*** -0.174** -0.707*** -0.343*** -0.232*** -0.711*** 
 (0.077) (0.087) (0.150) (0.078) (0.087) (0.153) 
World Inflationt-1 -0.006 -0.014 -0.014 -0.002 -0.012 -0.006 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.035) (0.016) (0.018) (0.034) 
Fiscal Balancet-1 -0.005*** -0.004** -0.017*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
R2 0.207 0.205 0.283 0.149 0.142 0.265 
N. of observations 1800 1305 487 2076 1549 520 
N. of countries 121 121 108 138 138 118 
First-stage regression       
Instruments:       
CBI regional  1.134*** 1.175*** 1.123*** 1.128*** 1.075*** 1.245*** 
 (0.105) (0.127) (0.209) (0.138) (0.163) (0.307) 
CBI regional 0.011 0.009 0.004 -0.008 0.012 -0.034 
        *Democracy (0.009) (0.012) (0.021) (0.033) (0.039) (0.076) 
First-stage F-Statistic 72.16 52.52 19.74 74.40 53.45 20.31 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects (not reported). * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Finally, we consider other estimation strategies. Previous studies use panel-corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) to deal with a lagged dependent variable (Arnone and Romelli 2013, 
Bodea and Hicks 2015b). Nevertheless, PCSE is not appropriate for our analyses because the 
number of cross-sectional units is greater than the number of time-series observations, what 
could bias t-statistics. We pursue two alternative methodologies. First, we remove the lagged 
dependent variable and estimate equation (1) using fixed effects (Klomp and De Haan 2010). We 
do not use this estimation in the main models because the dynamic nature of the panel is 
especially relevant: current inflation is affected by its past values. The methodological drawback is 
that point estimates would be less precise since the variance tends to be higher when omitting the 
lag – due to a specification error (Mizon 1995). Second, the standard solution to avoid Nickell 
bias is to use GMM dynamic panel data estimators (Arellano and Bond 1991, Arellano and Bover 
1995, Blundell and Bond 1998). This approach addresses the issues of joint endogeneity of all 
explanatory variables in a dynamic formulation, and mitigates potential biases induced by fixed 
effects. However, the instrument count can easily grow large relative to the sample size 
(Roodman 2009). The danger associated with having too many instruments relative to 
observations is that they can overfit endogenous variables, failing to expunge their endogenous 
components and biasing coefficient estimates. Appendix I shows that our results hold with these 
two alternative estimation techniques. 
 
Conclusions 
The main goal of central bank independence is to contain the inflationary effects of 
political pressures – otherwise, the advice should be limited to enacting conservative monetary 
policies, and not necessarily granting independence to the central bank. This paper studies the 
extent and some of the conditions under which central bank independence has anti-inflationary 
effects. In general, we find that delegation to central banks is associated with lower inflation rates 
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in most developing countries – including not only democracies, as previous studies suggest, but 
also many authoritarian regimes. This finding is important for the literature on the political 
economy of central bank independence, and also for a growing literature examining the role of 
institutions in authoritarian regimes. 
The core of our study is to disentangle whether the anti-inflationary effects of central 
bank independence vary depending on the incumbents’ incentives to manipulate macroeconomic 
outcomes, particularly during election years. We argue that if delegation of monetary policy to 
central banks is a means to curb politically-induced inflationary pressures, these curbing effects 
should be especially evident when incumbents have more incentives to manipulate 
macroeconomic outcomes. We assume said incentives to peak during election years, and 
especially when there is incertitude regarding the electoral outcome. We show that central bank 
independence has stronger inflation-curbing effects during election years, and we find that these 
effects are also observed in non-democratic elections – the magnitude of the effect is smaller for 
autocracies, but it is still significant. We attribute this result to the existence of incentives for 
developing countries – including some authoritarian countries – to rely on institutional 
mechanisms to increase their macroeconomic credibility, and their willingness to respect central 
bank independence when that respect is the costliest. In very authoritarian contexts, in which 
elections are a mere facade, we observe no anti-inflationary effects. 
Our analyses also show that electoral uncertainty affects central bank independence’s 
effects on inflation. Inflationary pressures seem to be higher when there is more electoral 
competition, making central bank independence even more relevant as electoral uncertainty 
increases. This finding, along with the finding regarding election years, increases our confidence 
in the likelihood that the relationship between central bank independence and inflation varies 
depending on the political incentives to boost the economy as we suggest, and it is not a spurious 
correlation. 
 29 
While our findings are suggestive of the existence opportunistic business cycle, more 
research is needed to determine the extent of these cycles when monetary policy is under direct 
control of the executive branch. Still, our results may help understanding why there is little 
evidence of said cycles. As Krause (2005:78) stated, “failure to incorporate incumbents’ re-
election odds” – proxied here as electoral competition – “is one plausible explanation why 
[political business cycles] are not observed regarding macroeconomic outcomes.” 
In all, our results suggest that monetary institutions affect the ability of incumbents to 
influence macroeconomic outcomes – in this case, inflation. This highlights the importance of 
accounting for domestic and international monetary constraints to better understand the 
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Appendix A. Countries included in the analyses 
 
Afghanistan Cyprus Kyrgyz Republic Saudi Arabia 
Albania Djibouti Liberia Senegal 
Algeria Dominica Libya Serbia 
Antigua & Barbuda Dominican Republic Lithuania Seychelles 
Argentina Ecuador Macedonia, FYR Sierra Leone 
Armenia Egypt, Arab Rep. Madagascar Singapore 
Azerbaijan El Salvador Malawi Slovak Republic 
Bahamas, The Equatorial Guinea Malaysia Slovenia 
Bahrain Estonia Maldives Solomon Islands 
Bangladesh Ethiopia Mali South Africa 
Barbados Fiji Malta Sri Lanka 
Belarus Gabon Mauritania St. Kitts and Nevis 
Belize Gambia, The Mauritius St. Lucia 
Benin Georgia Mexico St. Vincent & the Grenadines 
Bhutan Ghana Moldova Sudan 
Bolivia Grenada Mongolia Suriname 
Bosnia & Herzegovina Guatemala Montenegro Syrian Arab Republic 
Botswana Guinea Morocco Tajikistan 
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Tanzania 
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Burkina Faso Haiti Nepal Timor-Leste 
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Cabo Verde India Niger Tonga 
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Central African Republic Iraq Pakistan Uganda 
Chad Israel Panama Ukraine 
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China Jordan Paraguay Uruguay 
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Comoros Kenya Philippines Venezuela, RB 
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Appendix B. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Inflation 2109 29.259 591.198 0.015 24411.030 
CBI 2109 0.547 0.189 0.122 0.979 
Democracy (Polity2) 1829 3.103 6.065 -10.000 10.000 
Democracy (Freedom House) 2109 3.586 1.713 1.000 7.000 
GDP per capita 2108 4305.147 6478.553 140.815 61608.110 
Trade openness 2099 86.948 50.927 10.079 531.737 
Peg 2109 0.688 0.463 0.000 1.000 
World inflation 2109 5.127 2.111 2.917 12.738 
Fiscal balance 2109 -1.764 13.072 -487.312 44.901 
Any election 2109 0.256 0.436 0.000 1.000 
Legislative election 1968 0.140 0.347 0.000 1.000 
Executive election 1967 0.050 0.219 0.000 1.000 
Both elections 2109 0.078 0.268 0.000 1.000 
Regional CBI 2079 0.542 0.100 0.292 0.753 
Margin of majority 1738 0.641 0.209 0.032 1.000 
Capital account openness 2051 0.444 0.345 0.000 1.000 











Table D1: Inflation and election years, 1980-2012 (Polity2) 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log) 
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CBI    -0.706** -0.699** -0.571** -0.577** 
   (0.312) (0.313) (0.279) (0.280) 
Democracy 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.021 0.020 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.017) 
CBI*Democracy     -0.031 -0.028 
     (0.033) (0.033) 
Inflationt-1  0.363*** 0.356*** 0.336*** 0.338*** 0.334*** 0.336*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.215* 0.237** 0.350*** 0.351*** 0.332*** 0.334*** 
 (0.116) (0.119) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) 
Trade opennesst-1 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Peg -0.253*** -0.265*** -0.278*** -0.278*** -0.278*** -0.278*** 
 (0.070) (0.071) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
World Inflationt-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Fiscal Balancet-1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Any election -0.022  -0.033  -0.033  
 (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.042)  
Executive election  -0.100  -0.092  -0.091 
  (0.063)  (0.068)  (0.069) 
Legislative election  -0.053  -0.040  -0.040 
  (0.065)  (0.069)  (0.069) 
Both elections  -0.013  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055) 
Total Effect of CBI     -0.601** -0.605** 
(β1 + β3)     (0.277) (0.279) 
R2  0.230 0.226 0.220 0.221 0.220 0.222 
N of observations 2073 1949 1833 1816 1833 1816 
N of countries 128 127 126 124 126 124 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, 




Appendix D (cont.) 
Table D2: Inflation and election years, 1980-2012 (Freedom House) 
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log) 
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CBI    -0.762** -0.735** -0.986 -0.874 
   (0.311) (0.301) (0.656) (0.665) 
Democracy -0.013 -0.002 -0.033 -0.024 -0.065 -0.043 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.082) (0.085) 
CBI*Democracy     0.067 0.042 
     (0.150) (0.153) 
Inflationt-1  0.331*** 0.339*** 0.307*** 0.324*** 0.306*** 0.324*** 
 (0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.050) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.268** 0.251** 0.378*** 0.349*** 0.373*** 0.345*** 
 (0.118) (0.117) (0.126) (0.122) (0.127) (0.123) 
Trade opennesst-1 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Peg -0.284*** -0.288*** -0.314*** -0.299*** -0.313*** -0.298*** 
 (0.070) (0.071) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) 
World Inflationt-1 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Fiscal Balancet-1 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Any election -0.006  -0.018  -0.018  
 (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.040)  
Executive election  -0.088  -0.073  -0.073 
  (0.062)  (0.067)  (0.067) 
Legislative election  -0.027  -0.016  -0.016 
  (0.060)  (0.063)  (0.063) 
Both elections  -0.008  0.005  0.005 
  (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.055) 
Total Effect of CBI     -0.919* -0.833 
(β1 + β3)     (0.526) (0.531) 
R2  0.191 0.208 0.177 0.203 0.178 0.203 
N of observations 2380 2116 2109 1967 2109 1967 
N of countries 146 139 143 135 143 135 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, 






Table E1: Inflation and electoral competition during election years, 1980-2012.  
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
 
 Polity2 Freedom House 
 (1) (2) 
CBI  -2.389*** -2.283*** 
 (0.799) (0.770) 
Margin -1.550* -1.569* 
 (0.796) (0.816) 
CBI*Margin 2.503* 2.498* 
 (1.296) (1.315) 
Democracy 0.007 -0.047 
 (0.017) (0.067) 
Inflationt-1  0.388*** 0.393*** 
 (0.111) (0.106) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.659* 0.644** 
 (0.353) (0.325) 
Trade opennesst-1 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Peg -0.624*** -0.617*** 
 (0.126) (0.128) 
World Inflationt-1 -0.008 0.001 
 (0.036) (0.034) 
Fiscal Balancet-1 -0.012** -0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
R2 0.347 0.346 
N. of observations 467 496 
N. of countries 117 126 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, 





Table F1: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2012.  
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
Additional controls: Capital account openness and political instability  
 Polity2 Freedom House 
Years Non- election Election Non- election Election 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CBI  -0.506 -0.918** -0.533 -1.486* 
 (0.332) (0.440) (0.685) (0.803) 
Democracy 0.013 0.025 -0.006 -0.165 
 (0.020) (0.028) (0.090) (0.110) 
CBI*Democracy -0.022 -0.029 -0.036 0.171 
 (0.041) (0.045) (0.172) (0.177) 
Inflationt-1  0.328*** 0.345*** 0.285*** 0.351*** 
 (0.048) (0.103) (0.044) (0.101) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.341** 0.774** 0.401*** 0.670** 
 (0.146) (0.321) (0.141) (0.308) 
Trade opennesst-1 0.002* -0.002 0.002* -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Peg -0.123 -0.575*** -0.166* -0.568*** 
 (0.089) (0.130) (0.089) (0.130) 
World Inflationt-1 -0.015 -0.013 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.021) (0.032) (0.020) (0.031) 
Fiscal Balancet-1 -0.005*** -0.014*** -0.005*** -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) 
Political Instability 0.014 0.014 0.007 0.015 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) 
Capital Openness -0.383* -0.672** -0.401** -0.538** 
 (0.203) (0.264) (0.183) (0.263) 
Total Effect of CBI -0.528 -0.947** -0.569 -1.315** 
(β1 + β3) (0.319) (0.429) (0.539) (0.655) 
R2 0.217 0.332 0.162 0.324 
N. of observations 1295 503 1522 529 
N. of countries 121 117 137 126 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, 
but we do not report their estimates to preserve space. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix F (cont.) 
Figure F1:  Marginal effects of Central Bank Independence at different levels of Democracy.  





































Table G1: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2012.  
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
Additional controls: Interaction with exchange rate regime  
 Polity2 Freedom House 
Years Non- election Election Non- election Election 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CBI  -0.881* -1.227** -0.902* -1.155* 
 (0.526) (0.616) (0.501) (0.589) 
Peg -0.418 -0.735** -0.395 -0.751** 
 (0.296) (0.337) (0.263) (0.337) 
CBI*Peg 0.487 0.223 0.342 0.261 
 (0.495) (0.515) (0.450) (0.518) 
Inflationt-1  0.342*** 0.392*** 0.300*** 0.397*** 
 (0.048) (0.105) (0.0449) (0.101) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.317** 0.644* 0.361*** 0.609** 
 (0.135) (0.328) (0.136) (0.305) 
Trade opennesst-1 0.002* -0.003 0.002* -0.002 
 (0.0009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
World Inflationt-1 -0.017 -0.016 -0.01 -0.010 
 (0.020) (0.034) (0.019) (0.032) 
Fiscal Balancet-1 -0.004*** -0.0124** -0.005*** -0.012** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) 
Democracy  0.004 0.008 -0.019 -0.056 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.037) (0.060) 
Total Effect of CBI -0.393 -1.004** -0.056* -0.894**  
(βCBI + βCBI*Peg) (0.326) (0.422) (.319) (0.416) 
R2 0.211 0.339 0.158 0.338 
N. of observations 1,326 507 1,570 539 
N. of countries 125 119 142 128 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, 




Table H1: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2012.  
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation: Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
Additional controls: Ideology 
 Polity2 Freedom House 
 Non- election 
years 
Election years Non- election 
years 
Election years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CBI  -0.320 -0.866** -0.681 -1.318* 
 (0.332) (0.415) (0.712) (0.737) 
Democracy 0.024 0.028 -0.050 -0.157 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.095) (0.121) 
CBI*Democracy -0.030 -0.027 0.051 0.142 
 (0.043) (0.046) (0.175) (0.196) 
Inflationt-1  0.319*** 0.377*** 0.301*** 0.376*** 
 (0.048) (0.106) (0.046) (0.044) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.262* 0.605* 0.284** 0.533** 
 (0.145) (0.328) (0.138) (0.241) 
Trade opennesst-1 0.002* -0.003 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Peg -0.170** -0.590*** -0.183** -0.583*** 
 (0.083) (0.131) (0.083) (0.120) 
World Inflationt-1 -0.005 -0.012 0.002 -0.005 
 (0.019) (0.033) (0.020) (0.024) 
Fiscal Balancet-1 -0.004*** -0.012** -0.004*** -0.011** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) 
Leftt-1 -0.193 -0.137 -0.150 -0.146 
 (0.130) (0.127) (0.105) (0.132) 
Total Effect of CBI -0.350 -0.893** -0.630 -1.177** 
(β1 + β3) (0.321) (0.413) (0.558) (0.581) 
R2 0.201 0.326 0.175 0.324 
N. of observations 1262 491 1375 522 
N. of countries 120 115 130 124 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, 





Appendix H (cont.) 
Figure H1:  Marginal effects of Central Bank Independence at different levels of Democracy.  

































Table I1: Effect of CBI on inflation, 1980-2012.  
Dependent variable: Inflation rate (log)  
Estimation Fixed Effects with robust standard errors without lagged DV Two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample 
robust correction 
 Polity2 Freedom House Polity2 Freedom House 
Years Non- election Election Non- election Election Non- election Election Non- election Election 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CBI  -0.973** -1.300*** -1.268 -2.345** -0.836 -1.570*** -3.369* -3.880** 
 (0.418) (0.494) (0.940) (1.071) (0.509) (0.567) (1.885) (1.814) 
Democracy 0.029 0.032 -0.033 -0.223 0.004 0.137 -0.180 -0.553* 
 (0.026) (0.034) (0.113) (0.138) (0.040) (0.103) (0.236) (0.302) 
CBI*Democracy -0.042 -0.041 0.017 0.260 0.013 -0.181 0.387 0.788 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.217) (0.225) (0.081) (0.163) (0.449) (0.541) 
Inflationt-1      0.606*** 0.611** 0.392*** 0.458*** 
     (0.067) (0.251) (0.061) (0.147) 
GDP per capitat-1 0.344* 0.259 0.416** 0.254 -0.090* -0.071 -0.202 -0.109 
 (0.177) (0.268) (0.170) (0.261) (0.054) (0.152) (0.172) (0.168) 
Trade opennesst-1 0.002* -0.001 0.003* -0.000 -0.001 -0.003** 0.001 -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Peg -0.261** -0.721*** -0.309*** -0.729*** -0.223*** -0.003 0.002* -0.003 
 (0.102) (0.166) (0.099) (0.166) (0.075) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
World Inflationt-1 0.047** 0.061** 0.046** 0.071** -0.048*** -0.151** -0.057*** -0.070** 
 (0.021) (0.031) (0.021) (0.029) (0.017) (0.061) (0.019) (0.028) 
Fiscal Balancet-1 -0.005*** -0.002 -0.005*** -0.002 -0.002*** -0.001 -0.003 -0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) 
Total Effect of CBI -1.015** -1.341*** -1.250 -2.085** -0.823* -1.752*** -2.982* -3.091** 
(β1 + β3) (0.417) (0.502) (0.756) (0.879) (0.471) (0.542) (1.522) (1.375) 
R2 0.109 0.195 0.077 0.189     
N. of observations 1400 527 1658 567 1318 507 1570 539 
N. of countries 125 119 142 130 125 119 142 128 
Specification tests (p-values)         
Hansen test     0.967 0.563 0.982 0.529 
First order serial correlation     0.000 0.080 0.000 0.081 
Second order serial correlation     0.057 0.549 0.110 0.736 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include a constant term, country and decade fixed effects, but we do not report their estimates to preserve space. * p<0.1; 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figure I1:  Marginal effects of Central Bank Independence at different levels of Democracy.  








































Figure I2:  Marginal effects of Central Bank Independence at different levels of Democracy.  
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